Substitutive First-party Content as a Strategic Decision for Platform Growth – Evidence from a B2B Platform by Wei, Jianjiong et al.
Association for Information Systems 
AIS Electronic Library (AISeL) 
AMCIS 2020 Proceedings Strategic and Competitive Uses of IT 
Aug 10th, 12:00 AM 
Substitutive First-party Content as a Strategic Decision for 
Platform Growth – Evidence from a B2B Platform 
Jianjiong Wei 
Fudan Universitu, 16110690017@fudan.edu.cn 
Dawei (David) Zhang 
Lehigh University, daz215@lehigh.edu 
jie liu 
Fudan University, liujie@fudan.edu.cn 
Xueqi Wei 
Fudan University, weixueqi@fudan.edu.cn 
Follow this and additional works at: https://aisel.aisnet.org/amcis2020 
Wei, Jianjiong; Zhang, Dawei (David); liu, jie; and Wei, Xueqi, "Substitutive First-party Content as a Strategic 
Decision for Platform Growth – Evidence from a B2B Platform" (2020). AMCIS 2020 Proceedings. 9. 
https://aisel.aisnet.org/amcis2020/strategic_uses_it/strategic_uses_it/9 
This material is brought to you by the Americas Conference on Information Systems (AMCIS) at AIS Electronic 
Library (AISeL). It has been accepted for inclusion in AMCIS 2020 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of 
AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact elibrary@aisnet.org. 
 Substitutive First-party Content as a Strategic Decision 
The 2020 Americas Conference on Information Systems 1 
Substitutive First-party Content as a 
Strategic Decision for Platform Growth – 
Evidence from a B2B Platform  
Completed Research 
Jianjiong Wei 
Fudan University 
16110690017@fudan.edu.cn 
Dawei (David) Zhang 
Lehigh University 
daz215@lehigh.edu 
Jie Liu 
Fudan University 
liujie@fudan.edu.cn 
Xueqi Wei 
Fudan University 
weixueqi@fudan.edu.cn 
Abstract 
This paper examines the effect of substitutive first-party content (SFPC) as a strategic variable by a 
business-to-business (B2B) e-commerce platform. Constructing a unique time-series dataset, we find that 
SFPC’s impact differs in the early stage of the platform and in the later stage when it has a larger user base 
and has transformed itself into a service provider. In the early stage, increasing SFPC can attract more 
buyers to trade but may crowd out sellers, leading to an insignificant impact on total trading volume. In 
the second stage, however, SFPC no longer hurts seller participation and increases total trading volume. 
We also find that SFPC could attract new users consistently across the two stages. Our findings suggest a 
strategic role of SFPC to mitigate the “chicken‐and‐egg problem1” in the early stage of a two-sided B2B 
platform and to continuously grow platform size when it becomes more established. 
Keywords 
business-to-business (B2B), e-commerce platform, first-party content, cross-side network effects. 
Introduction 
Business-to-Business (B2B) E-commerce is a form of goods or service exchange among enterprises 
through an electronic platform. A B2B platform (e.g., Alibaba.com, eWorldTrade.com) connects sellers 
and buyers, both of which are enterprises, so that supply and demand can be matched on the platform2. 
According to Statista Digital Market Outlook’s estimation (Statista 2019), the global B2B E-commerce 
market values more than $12.2 trillion in 2019, compared to $2.0 trillion for the Business-to-Customer 
(B2C) market. It is expected that the adoption and investment in B2B E-commerce will continue to rise 
(Lowndes and Daigler 2016). 
Despite the size and growth of the B2B market, empirical research in a B2B context has been especially 
scarce (Tucker and Zhang 2010, Langer et al. 2012, Koh and Fichman 2014), likely due to the difficulty to 
1 The chicken-and-egg problem for a two-sided platform refers to the problem that is typically faced by an early-stage 
two-sided platform: seller participation and buyer participation depend on each other because of cross-side network 
effects, so to improve participation from either side the platform needs to attract enough participation from the other 
side first. 
2 A B2B platform can sell anything from physical goods (e.g., steel products, office furniture, business cards, etc.) to 
software (e.g., invoice software, security software, etc.) to services (e.g., call answering service, marketing service, 
office security service, etc.). 
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obtain relevant data (Jap 2003, Mithas and Jones 2007). Prior B2B literature mainly focus on topics 
about the determinants for adoption (e.g., Son and Benbasat 2007; Mishra and Agarwal  2010) and how 
the B2B model impacts the organizations (e.g. Rai and Tang 2014; Sankaranarayanan and Sundararajan  
2010).  
Our study uses a unique dataset from one of the leading B2B steel trading platforms in China to offer 
novel empirical evidence regarding first-party content on a B2B platform as a strategic decision for 
platform growth. Prior literature defines first-party content as products or services provided by a multi-
sided platform itself (Hagiu and Spulber 2013). They further differentiate substitutive first-party content 
(SFPC) from complementary first-party content (CFPC). The former is the platform’s own content that 
competes with that offered by the sellers on the same platform; the latter represents the products and 
services offered by the platform that could enhance the value of those provided by the sellers. We mainly 
focus on the impact of SFPC in this paper, which means the B2B platform sells steel products that are 
substitutes to those provided by third-party sellers on the same platform. It is worth to note that the B2B 
platform could also provide CFPC, for example, logistics and financial services that could be helpful for 
buyers or sellers. 
Most of the existing literature about SFPC focus on platform contexts such as gaming consoles (Cennamo 
et al. 2018), app stores (Li and Agarwal 2017; Wen and Zhu  2019; Foerderer  et al. 2018) and B2C 
platforms such as Amazon (Jiang et al. 2011, Zhu and Liu 2018). They exclusively study either the profit-
maximization strategies for the platforms or third-party sellers’ response to the platforms’ decision to 
offer SFPC (i.e., platform owners’ entry). Our paper focuses on the impact and strategic use of SFPC in a 
B2B context. 
A typical B2B platform exhibits cross-side network effects3 just as a B2C platform (e.g., Amazon) does: 
more sellers on the platform attract more buyers to join the platform, and vice versa. However, there are a 
few critical characteristics regarding a B2B trading platform which differentiates it from other types of E-
commerce platforms such as B2C and C2C (Customer to Customer). Malone et al. (1987) summarize two 
characteristics of B2B products — asset specificity and complexity. Asset specificity measures the degree 
to which a product utilized by one firm cannot be easily utilized by other firms; complexity measures the 
amount of information needed to describe the attributes of a product (Son and Benbasat 2007). B2B 
products tend to have, on average, higher asset specificity and complexity compared with personal 
products typically traded on the 2C platforms. Take steel products for example, different steel products 
differ in usage (e.g., structure steel, ship building steel, and gas transmission pipe), classification (e.g., 
low/high carbon, welded, and cold forging), grade, size, main mills (i.e., factories that manufacture steel), 
and other dimensions. It takes a great amount of information to describe the attributes of a steel product, 
and it is usually not easy for one company to directly utilize the steel products ordered by another 
company. Other characteristics of B2B trading include high demand uncertainty (Choudhury 1997), 
market volatility (Bello and Gilliland 1997), larger monetary value, and strong demand for CFPC because 
of the complexity of value assessment (Mahadevan 2003). Due to these critical differences, whether the 
findings regarding other types of e-marketplaces from prior research could apply in a B2B context is 
unclear. 
Given above, it is our goal in this research to fill the gap in this important but surprisingly unexplored 
area – the strategic use of SFPC on a B2B platform. Specifically, we study the following three questions:1) 
how does SFPC impact buyer and seller participation on a two-sided B2B platform? 2) How does SFPC 
affect platform size in terms of total trading volume and new users? 3) How can a B2B platform 
strategically use SFPC for growth as it evolves from a relatively small, early-stage marketplace to a more 
established platform? We believe answering these questions not only provide timely empirical evidence to 
the B2B literature in Information Systems (IS), but also bears practical implications for the firms. To our 
knowledge, we are the first to empirically examine the impact of SFPC for a two-sided B2B platform. 
Our results show that in the early stage, more SFPC is associated with improved buyer participation, 
although it weakens seller participation and has no impact on total trading volume on the platform; in the 
second stage of the platform when it has a larger user base and provides significantly more value-added 
 
3 Number of sellers and seller participation on the platform has a positive impact on buyers’ willingness to join the 
platform and to participate in trading activities on the platform, vice versa. 
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services, SFPC still has positive effects on buyer participation but does not hurt seller participation 
anymore; moreover, it increases total trading volume and attracts new users to the platform.  
The next section reviews relevant literature. We then describe the background of our data and 
summarizes our main variables. Estimation models and results are provided in the next section, followed 
by conclusions and discussions. 
Literature Review  
Our paper is related to the stream of research that study the impact of first-party content by a multi-sided 
platform. Prior studies in the economics and business literature discuss the motivation of a platform 
owner providing first-party content as an approach to solve the “chicken‐and‐egg problem4” (e.g., Evans  
et al. 2008; Hagiu and Spulber 2013), maximize profit (e.g., Jiang et al. 2011; Zhu and Liu 2018) and 
incentivize third-party innovations (e.g., Li and Agarwal 2017; Wen and Zhu 2019; Foerderer et al.  2018).  
Other papers in this stream study the specific impact of first-party content on the platform and its 
participants. Carlton et al. (2010) analytically show a negative impact of substitutive first-party products 
by a monopolist on third-party sellers. Gawer and Henderson  (2007) use the case of Intel to demonstrate 
that platform entry with formulating organizational structure and processes as a friendly signal that can 
stimulate potential entrants and product innovation. Otherwise, complementors will hesitate contributing 
to the platform and thus “crowding out” complementary innovation. Hagiu and Spulber (2013) develop an 
analytical model to show that when first-party content and third-party content are substitutes, the 
platform facing unfavorable expectations always invests more in first-party content than the platform 
facing favorable expectations. Foerderer et al. (2018) demonstrate that the entry of Google Photos on the 
Google Play platform triggered complementary third-party innovation because of the increased consumer 
attention for photography apps. On the contrary, when faced with the threat of Google's entry into the 
Android app markets, developers may respond by reducing innovation efforts and raising prices for the 
affected apps (Wen and Zhu 2019).  
Several empirical papers suggest that using first-party content to enter the market and compete with 
third-party participants can be optimal for the platforms (Farrell and Katz 2000; Adner and Kapoor 
2010); while others argue that they should not do so because it discourages third-parties’ incentives to 
innovate (Wen and Zhu 2019). The mixed findings may be attributed to factors such as size of 
complementors (Li and Agarwal 2017); openness decisions of platforms such as Google versus Apple 
(Kang 2017) and industry characteristics (Cennamo et al. 2018).  
Our paper is also broadly related to the empirical research regarding a B2B intermediary. Tucker and 
Zhang (2010) use field experiment data from a B2B website to examine seller response to different 
strategies to advertise platform user base. Koh and Fichman (2014) examine how selling and buying 
activities on B2B exchanges affect buyers’ multihoming preferences. Langer et al. (2012) estimate an 
empirical model in a B2B setting that reveals the dynamic tradeoff between channel inertia and the 
adverse price effect. Their findings suggest that buyer size and experience might be central in 
understanding customer retention.  
In sum, there has been a dearth of empirical research in a B2B context, likely because it is difficult to 
obtain data from a B2B platform. Moreover, prior studies tend to explore first-party content in the context 
of a two-sided market, and do not differentiate different types of e-commerce platforms such as B2B and 
B2C (Business to Customer). Our research is among the first to empirically explore the effects of first-
party content by a B2B platform. Due to page limit, we do not explicitly write out our hypotheses. 
Data 
For this study, we have collected data from one of the leading online steel trading platforms in China. The 
company was founded in late 2000s and transformed itself into an online B2B platform around 2013. It 
 
4 The chicken-and-egg problem for a two-sided platform refers to the problem that is typically faced by an early-stage 
two-sided platform: seller participation and buyer participation depend on each other because of cross-side network 
effects, so to improve participation from either side the platform needs to attract enough participation from the other 
side first. 
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focuses on connecting upstream steel product sellers with downstream buyers and offering credit 
endorsement to both buyers and sellers in the steel market. In order to become a registered seller on the 
platform, the seller needs to obtain a series of strict certification that provide quality and delivery 
assurance. Sellers can post information about their steel products on the platform, including size, 
location, quantity, weight, offering price 5, telephone number of the sales person, and other related 
information. Buyers can not only browse information posted by sellers, but can also post their requests for 
steel products which are visible to the sellers. Once there is a match, the platform facilitates the 
transaction and delivery of the steel using its own supply chain, and charges a fixed fee for each tonnage of 
successfully traded steel. 
The steel products sold on the platform come from two channels: the platform could first purchase from 
upstream sellers and then resell the products to downstream buyers; or the products could come directly 
from third-party sellers. In the first case, the platform is providing first-party content which could be a 
substitute for third-party sellers’ steel products (i.e., SFPC), and thus is directly competing with third-
party sellers on the platform. However, SFPC is expected to attract more buyers and thus generate 
positive cross-side network effects. Therefore, the use of SFPC could be a strategic decision depending on 
its net impact on the platform during different time periods. 
We have information on all transactions made on this online platform from March 01, 2014 to December 
31, 2018. There are in total 2,736,344 transactions with 3,106 unique sellers and 22,201 unique buyers. 
For each transaction, we have information regarding the buyer’s and the seller’s unique identification 
numbers (ID), transaction ID, time of transaction, price paid, category and type of steel product, total 
weight of the steel product, and whether the seller is the platform itself. For each buyer and seller, we 
know the exact time when they registered with the platform, location of headquarter, and total registered 
capital. 
We then aggregate our raw datasets to the daily level. Specifically, we aggregate the total weight of all 
transactions where the seller is the platform as our measure of daily traded first-party goods. We also 
derive the daily unique numbers of sellers and buyers that participated in at least one transaction. In 
addition, we collect steel price index data from data.mysteel.com, which is a leading steel data provider in 
China. The index, available at the daily level, represents the average price trend of all steel products in 
China. Our final sample consists of 1170 observations, excluding national holidays and non-working 
weekends when the market was closed. Table 1 below describes our variables.  
Variables Operationalizatoin/Measurement Unit of 
Measurement  
Buyer Participation Number of distinct buyers that traded on the platform on the 
current day 
Firm 
Seller Participation Number of distinct sellers that traded on the platform on the 
current day 
Firm 
Substitutive First-
Party Content 
(SFPC) 
Average daily weight of steel products traded on the platform 
over the last 7 days, not including the current day 
Ton 
Complementary 
First-Party Content 
(CFPC) 
Average daily number of services (e.g., logistics, financial, data, 
and steel processing services) provided by the platform over the 
last 7 days, not including the current day 
Service 
Platform Trading 
Volume 
Total weight of steel products traded on the platform on the 
current day  
Ton 
Platform New 
Users 
Number of newly registered users on the current day; A user is an 
agent that works as the contact person for either a seller or a 
buyer. One seller or buyer could have more than one agent on the 
platform. 
Person 
Total Sellers Average daily number of total registered sellers on the platform 
over the last 7 days, not including the current day 
Firm 
Buyer Participation Average daily number of distinct buyer that traded on the Firm 
 
5 Final price and after-sale services can usually be negotiated between the buyer and the seller. 
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Past platform over the last 7 days, not including the current day 
Total Users Average daily number of total registered users on the platform 
over the last 7 days, not including the current day 
Person 
Total Weight Average daily weight of steel products traded on the platform 
over the last 7 days, not including the current day 
Ton 
Second Class Average daily number of second-class steel grades6 traded on the 
platform over the last 7 days, not including the current day. 
Grade of steel 
Third Class Average daily number of third-class steel grades7 traded on the 
platform over the last 7 days, not including the current day 
Grade of steel 
Factories Average daily number of steel factories that produced the steel 
products traded on the platform over the last 7 days, not 
including the current day 
Factory 
Destinations Average daily number of shipment destiantions over the last 7 
days, not including the current day  
Destination 
Price Disadvantage The ratio of average traded price over market index on the 
current day, the larger the ratio, the more expensive the steel 
products are on the platform relative to the market price and 
thus the bigger the price disadvantage for trading on the 
platform. Average traded price = total daily traded value / total 
daily weight; Market index measures the overall market price 
trend for the steel market; 
 
Employees Average daily total number of employees of the platform over the 
last 7 days, not including the current day 
Person 
Weekdays Dummy variables for the current day. Specifically, four dummy 
variables for Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, 
respectively. Reference category is Monday. 
 
Holiday Dummy variable for the current day, equals one if it is within two 
weeks immediately before or after national holidays such as the 
Spring Festival in China 
 
Work Weekend Dummy variable for the current day, equals 1 if it is a working 
weekend day. Reference category is Monday. 
 
Table 1. Variable Definitions8 
Estimation Models and Results 
We estimate the following four regression models to assess the impact of SFPC on buyer and seller 
participation as well as platform size. Given that our dataset is a time-series, all variables are subscripted 
with “t” to indicate it’s the value for day t. Detailed descriptions and measurements of each variable are 
presented in Table 1. In equations (1) and (2), we account for cross-side network effects by controlling 
TotalSellers and BuyerParticpationPast 9 , respectively. To avoid mutual causation, TotalSellers and 
BuyerParticipationPast both take the average daily value over the past 7 days, not including day t (i.e., 
moving averages). 
 
6 Examples of second-class grades of steels are: Structure Steel; Ship building Steel; pipe Making, etc.  
7  Examples of third-class grades of steels are: Q195-0.08mm*600mm, Q235-0.25mm*2000mm, SAE1006-
0.16mm*1300mm, etc. 
8 As a robustness check, we use longer time periods (e.g., 30 days) when calculating the “average daily numbers” in 
Table 1; the results stay consistent with those using the 7-day time window. 
9 It is worth to note that we use BuyerParticipationPast rather than the total number of buyers because every firm 
registered on the platform can be a buyer, whereas only those go through a series of certification can be registered as a 
“seller”. Therefore, we use the unique number of buyers that have bought through the platform as a measure of the 
network effects from the buyer side.  
  Substitutive First-party Content as a Strategic Decision 
  
 The 2020 Americas Conference on Information Systems 6 
BuyerParticipation,t= α 0+ α 1 SFPCt + α 2 TotalSellerst + α 3 SecondClasst + α 4 ThirdClasst +α 5 Factoriest+ α 6 
Destinationst+α7PriceDisadvantaget +α8 Employeest +α9 Holidayt + α10 Weekdayt +α11 CFPCt+ μ  (1) 
 
SellerParticipationt=α0+α1 SFPCt + α2 BuyerParticipationPastt +α3 SecondClasst +α4 ThirdClasst +α5 Factoriest+α6 
Destinationst+α7PriceDisadvantaget +α8 Employeest +α9 Holidayt + α10 Weekdayt +α11 CFPCt+ μ                (2) 
 
PlatformTradingVolume,t=α 0+α 1 SFPCt + α 2 TotalUsert +α 3 SecondClasst +α4 ThirdClasst +α 5 Factoriest+α 6 
Destinationst+α7PriceDisadvantaget +α8 Employeest +α9 Holidayt + α10 Weekdayt +α11 CFPCt+ μ  (3) 
 
PlatformNewUsert= α 0+ α 1 SFPCt + α 2TotalWeightt + α 3 SecondClasst + α 4 ThirdClasst + α 5 Factoriest+ α 6 
Destinationst+α7PriceDisadvantaget +α8 Employeest +α9 Holidayt + α10 Weekdayt +α11 CFPCt+ μ  (4) 
 
Autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity are two common problems in time series datasets. To consistently 
estimate the variance-covariance matrix of our model parameters, we adopt the heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent (HAC) estimators. Specifically, we use the procedure that uses the Bartlett 
kernel weights suggested by Newey and West (1987, 1994). The significance of the coefficients can be 
assessed by partial z tests. 
We first estimate Equations (1) – (4) on the pooled dataset of 1170 observations covering years 2014 to 
2018. The results are presented in Table 2. Controlling for network effects, we find that SFPC has a 
positive impact on buyer participation while a negative effect on seller participation. This finding suggests 
that SFPC can attract more distinct buyers to the platform, at the same time it disincentivizes the sellers 
who may view SFPC as competition and thus a threat to their product sales on the platform. Moreover, we 
find that SFPC has a positive and significant impact on platform size measured by either total weight 
traded or total number of agents registered on the platform. 
Overall, our results indicate that even though SFPC may crowd out sellers, its impact on buyer 
participation is much greater and thus more SFPC increases both total weights traded and total number of 
new agents on the platform. 
 Dependent variables 
 Buyer 
Participation 
Seller 
Participation 
Platform Trading 
Volume 
Platform New 
Users 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
SFPC 0.022*** -0.007** 1.978** 0.002** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.867) (0.001) 
Total Sellers -0.001    
 (0.064)    
Buyer Participation 
Past 
 0.397***   
  (0.084)   
Total Users   0.967  
   (1.006)  
Total Weight    0.0004*** 
    (0.0001) 
Price Disadvantage 875.764*** -101.660 23,823.170 15.485 
 (169.361) (102.576) (31,782.400) (38.660) 
Second Class 9.068** -4.614** -12.658 -3.705*** 
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 (3.861) (2.285) (759.107) (0.912) 
Third Class -0.661** -0.394*** 64.238 0.125** 
 (0.273) (0.122) (51.626) (0.053) 
Factories 4.244*** 0.930*** 337.485*** -0.374*** 
 (0.610) (0.355) (90.682) (0.116) 
Destination 0.189 0.116 158.467*** 0.353*** 
 (0.278) (0.139) (52.898) (0.086) 
Employees -0.521 0.351*** -177.153* -0.221*** 
 (0.451) (0.086) (105.909) (0.054) 
CFPC 16.689 3.436 5,464.313** 5.185** 
 (11.034) (4.057) (2,263.501) (2.141) 
Holiday 1.718 -13.508 3,296.833 -20.177*** 
 (16.375) (8.793) (3,189.780) (4.302) 
Tuesday -80.784*** -31.611*** -16,342.960*** -5.542*** 
 (7.475) (3.232) (1,608.280) (1.576) 
Wednesday -106.362*** -41.314*** -20,765.500*** -5.993*** 
 (8.415) (3.642) (1,767.446) (1.690) 
Thursday -108.675*** -44.649*** -20,242.240*** -6.368*** 
 (8.611) (3.921) (1,830.621) (1.674) 
Friday -63.029*** -21.553*** -11,727.230*** -10.188*** 
 (6.744) (3.141) (1,510.895) (1.375) 
WorkWeekend -93.361*** -43.597*** -17,295.080*** -15.459*** 
 (20.651) (13.265) (3,786.872) (4.072) 
Constant -719.087*** 98.836 -18,396.130 100.579*** 
 (157.339) (93.539) (28,671.430) (34.785) 
Observations10 1,123 1,123 1,123 1,123 
Adjusted R2 0.878 0.949 0.800 0.322 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 2. Effects of SFPC using the Pooled Dataset 
 
Our findings from the pooled dataset may not hold across different development stages of the platform. In 
particular, we would like to assess the effects of SFPC in two stages: the early stage versus the more 
mature and established stage of the platform. Our time series sample is divided into two subsamples on 
the day of September 30, 2016, so that our first stage (stage 1) is from March 01, 2014 to September 30, 
2016; and our second stage (stage 2) from October 01, 2016 to December 31, 2018, again excluding all 
non-working weekends and national holidays. The reason that we choose September 30, 2016 to divide 
our sample is twofold. First, the platform introduced and started to implement significantly more and new 
CFPC in October 2016, including logistics support, financial services for sellers and buyers, data services 
as well as other value-added services. In fact, October 2016 was viewed a major milestone in the 
platform’s history because of these CFPC introduced at once. After this milestone the platform kept 
improving its CFPC but there was not another similar milestone in terms of providing significantly more 
CFPC. Second, from figures 1 – 3, we can see that on average, stage 2 features a larger SFPC, buyer and 
seller participation rate, and the market price index. Therefore, stage 1 represents the early stage of the 
platform given that it only transformed itself into an online B2B platform around 2013; and stage 2 is the 
 
10 The numbers of observations are smaller than 1170 due to the construction of moving averages for several 
variables. 
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later stage when the platform has grown much bigger and has become more reputable for online B2B steel 
trading. 
The subsample results on buyer/seller participation and platform size are presented in Table 3. We find 
that SFPC consistently has a positive impact on buyer participation across the two stages. However, its 
impact on seller participation is negative and significant in the early stage, and strikingly, insignificant in 
the later stage which may be due to the substantial “lock-in” effects on sellers once the platform exhibits 
significantly larger network effects. 
Interestingly, SFPC has a positive and significant association with total weight traded only in the second 
stage (insignificant in the first stage), suggesting that SFPC has little impact on trading volume in the 
earlier stage whereas its return on weight becomes positive and significant in the second stage. In 
addition, SFPC is positively associated with the total number of newly registered users in both stages.  
 Dependent variable: 
 Buyer Participation Seller Participation Platform Trading Volume Platform New User 
 Stage1 Stage2 Stage1 Stage2 Stage1 Stage2 Stage1 Stage2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
SFPC 0.014*** 0.017** -0.013*** -0.0002 -0.977 4.664*** 0.006*** 0.004* 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.002) (0.004) (0.978) (1.348) (0.002) (0.002) 
Total Seller -0.035 0.060   -0.977 4.664***   
 (0.045) (0.109)       
Buyer Participation Past   0.251*** 0.484***     
   (0.089) (0.103)     
Total User     0.236 0.412   
     (1.182) (1.523)   
Total Weight       0.001*** 0.0002 
       (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Price Disadvantage -26.784 848.918*** -47.558 -36.035 -8,830.232 49,014.010 126.247* -2.243 
 (266.775) (312.618) (92.363) (106.096) (43,000.310) (40,930.790) (73.825) (62.609) 
Second Class 4.520 -15.148 0.298 -3.164 634.388 -1,597.264 1.627 1.237 
 (5.212) (10.843) (2.406) (4.562) (1,203.514) (1,952.139) (1.270) (3.311) 
Third Class -0.041 2.077* -0.185 -0.310 86.631 205.571 -0.025 0.023 
 (0.262) (1.118) (0.139) (0.522) (72.938) (210.105) (0.066) (0.396) 
Factories 1.666** 5.179*** 0.791** 0.096 130.842 453.138*** 0.080 -0.204 
 (0.659) (1.063) (0.344) (0.705) (167.585) (166.499) (0.185) (0.247) 
Destination 2.475** -0.235 1.109** -0.140 274.268 57.940 -0.417 0.151** 
 (0.984) (0.520) (0.474) (0.211) (237.314) (70.892) (0.285) (0.076) 
Employee 0.343 -1.031 0.001 0.741*** -61.156 -95.264 -0.469*** -0.091 
 (0.394) (0.876) (0.080) (0.102) (115.469) (160.740) (0.054) (0.060) 
CFPC 9.643 23.129 10.015** -19.499 6,759.063** 6,903.047 9.297*** 10.006 
 (10.525) (34.066) (4.332) (15.733) (3,291.805) (4,685.119) (2.743) (7.338) 
Holiday -38.312** 31.636 -15.306* -15.790 -1,362.605 4,038.507 -18.382*** -11.908*** 
 (18.640) (22.690) (8.142) (12.929) (3,908.539) (4,932.815) (5.252) (4.157) 
Tuesday -45.231*** -123.741*** -15.277*** -51.967*** -8,334.905*** -26,195.850*** -2.785 -9.212*** 
 (5.876) (12.780) (2.261) (5.716) (1,271.789) (2,840.164) (2.453) (1.848) 
Wednesday -66.325*** -155.266*** -22.816*** -63.556*** -12,505.450*** -30,879.750*** -2.659 -10.384*** 
 (7.237) (13.034) (2.956) (5.776) (1,850.039) (2,845.551) (2.377) (2.140) 
Thursday -63.035*** -163.884*** -23.738*** -69.401*** -11,703.720*** -30,657.430*** -2.533 -11.237*** 
 (7.559) (12.842) (3.274) (6.078) (1,824.563) (2,934.563) (2.103) (2.479) 
Friday -33.690*** -98.974*** -7.970*** -38.525*** -5,812.704*** -18,973.530*** -7.347*** -14.486*** 
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 (6.349) (10.482) (2.159) (5.167) (1,515.937) (2,592.445) (1.776) (2.117) 
Work Weekend -40.859** -145.968*** -20.048** -69.823*** -7,344.608** -26,241.470*** -8.575 -23.661*** 
 (18.614) (33.814) (9.035) (20.596) (2,961.184) (5,596.165) (5.674) (4.504) 
Constant 27.750 -780.336** 45.404 82.106 4,271.687 -58,578.910 5.109 4.519 
 (244.237) (339.087) (84.215) (177.849) (38,558.540) (51,730.130) (66.212) (58.218) 
Observations 598 525 598 525 598 525 598 525 
Adjusted R2 0.895 0.659 0.955 0.843 0.817 0.523 0.469 0.246 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Table 3. Effects of SFPC on Platform Participants and Performance across Two Stages 
Conclusions and Discussions 
In this study we construct a unique time-series dataset to explore the strategic use of SFPC for an online 
B2B platform. Our results across the two stages indicate that in the early stage, SFPC could help the 
platform improve its buyer participation and network size, although at a price of hurting seller 
participation and having no impact on total trading volume. In the second stage, SFPC not only positively 
impacts total trading volume on the platform and continues to improve buyer participation, but also has 
no evidence crowding out sellers. We believe this is because: 1) the platform has grown to a much larger 
size in the second stage, generating much stronger network effects; 2) the significantly more and 
improved CFPC also helps to lock in the sellers, making them less sensitive about the competition with 
SFPC. 
Overall, our results shed light on how SFPC could be a strategic decision by the platform to grow network 
size and improve platform performance. Our findings suggest that SFPC can be strategically used to solve 
the chicken-and-egg problem in a B2B platform’s early stage, although the platform may not want to over-
use SFPC when it does not have a significant lock-in effect because SFPC may hurt seller participation and 
does not contribute to platform growth in the early stage. SFPC could be used relatively more aggressively 
as a strategy for platform growth when the platform has become more established with more CFPC and a 
much larger user base. 
Although the use of first-party content has been studied by prior literature in economics (e.g. Armstrong 
2006; Li and Agarwal 2017; Wen and Zhu 2019; Foerderer, 2018; Jiang et al. 2011; Zhu and Liu 2018), 
there has been a dearth of empirical research in this field and few papers have focused on B2B settings. 
Our study extends the B2B literature and the first-party content literature by providing concrete and 
timely empirical evidence on the impact of SFPC for a two-sided B2B platform. 
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